Letter from Madden & Finucane Solicitors to Secretary of State
Peter Madden | 01 December 2003
Secretary of State Castle Buildings Belfast Dear Secretary of State, Re: Judge Cory's Report As you know, we act on behalf of the family of Pat Finucane.
For God and Ulster: An Alternative Guide to the Loyal Orders
PFC | 11 April 1998
This alternative guide to the Loyal Orders is an attempt to fill a gap, a gap in information about semi-secret organisations which have played a major role in the history of this island and a gap in understanding as to why a significant number of people have a problem with those organisations. Few...
Declassified documents from the National Archives on the dangers posed by rubber bullets.
The documents, which were found in the National Archives recently by the PFC detail concerns that technical data highlighting the lethal nature of rubber bullets might be exposed in the legal case for compensation being taken on behalf of Derry schoolboy Richard Moore who was blinded by a rubber bullet.
Outlines criteria for internment – explains why policy does not allow for arrest of loyalists except under certain circumstances. Poor quality copy but other copies below provide same detail.
Letter from Secretary of State William Whitelaw to General Officer Commanding Harry Tuzo outlining criteria for internment orders and why loyalists 'may not fall' within the new Order.
At point 1 (apologies for the quality of the copy) reference is made to a meeting at Stormont Castle on November 29 1972 where the GOC (General Officer Commanding - the British army) was asked to "draft an arrest policy covering the UVF and other extreme loyalist elements, though not the UDA per se."
Discusses the changes that would be required and asked a fascinating question at paragraph 4! Just what did the RUC object to? See memo from AW Stephens above.
Arrest policy for protestants - loose minute December 1972
MoD memo discussing the criteria that might be applied 'if and when' loyalists would be detained. Refers to loyalist violence including 'comparatively harmless vigilante activity'.
Note of a meeting in the Northern Ireland Office on 13 November 1974 including officials from various ministries, the Attorney General's Office and the Treasury Solicitor's Office. The 'Counsel' referred to in the document is almost certainly the legal counsel representing the British Government at the European court case taken by the Irish Government in respect of multiple violations of...
Memo of meeting between Attorney General and British Army
Two pages of a memo (AG 1971 p2 and AG 1971 p3) concerning the visit of a J.M. Parkin, Head of C2 at HQNI (British Army HQ) in the North to the then Attorney General Basil Kelly, a Unionist MP. In reference to any potential prosecutions of soldiers for the murder of civilians Parkin notes,
A diary of the meeting between J.M Parkin, Head of C2 and HQNI and Attorney General Basil Kelly and additional confirmation that the Attorney General fully understood that HQNI was telling him that he should not prosecute soldiers. In effect the military tail was wagging the legal dog. This meeting took place less than two months before Bloody Sunday
Brief for the British Attorney General (AG) in preparation for the 'Irish state case' (the Hooded Men) from September 1972 from DS10 (the Defence Secretariat at the MoD in London). Of interest is the disinformation provided to the AG, the most senior law officer in Britain, by the Ministry of Defence. At para 4 it is claimed that Ballykelly only...
Orwellian legal advice on UDA roadblocks from 1972 Advice note from Ministry of Home Affairs dated 22 August 1972 (by this date the duties of this Ministry had been taken over by the Northern Ireland Office) which seeks to retrospectively justify UDA roadblocks which were frequent throughout Belfast and elsewhere in the summer of 1972. The advice note states that...
Memo to Secretary of State on security options-Feb 1978 (added May 2018)
1978 memo to SoS (author unknown) outlining security options and highlighting the 'danger signs' that the (British) army are deploying patrols for "suppression" and Intelligence" with no intention of arresting and charging suspects. The memo goes on to suggest that any 'drift' back to army methods and goals is the "road that leads to executive action against terrorists, rather than...