Open letter from the PFC to PSNI Chief Constable Hugh Orde

On March 8 2005 Secretary of State Paul Murphy held a press conference at which he announced £30 million plus funding for a new unit which, according to the NIO press statement,

“will be under the direction and control of the Chief Constable and will look at some 1800 murders from 1969 up to the signing of the Agreement that remained unsolved.”
(NIO website)

The reference by the SoS to “1800 murders” is deeply offensive and inaccurate. This is based on the entirely fictitious premise that only two people were actually murdered by the British Army or RUC. The use of this language sent out a dangerous signal that has to date not been corrected.

A meeting between several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the PSNI shortly afterwards sought more clarity about PSNI thinking on the matter.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Serious Crime Review Team and the review of conflict related deaths. Some of the information provided at this meeting contradicted other information provided at the earlier NIO press conference. Some of the information clarified and expanded upon that already in the public domain.

Since these developments it has become obvious that many view your current proposal in relation to the Historical Enquiry Team with deep suspicion and one which is unlikely to win the co-operation, support or confidence of victims of state violence and collusion.

Speaking on BBC Spotlight in November 2004 you said that "a substantial degree of independence" was important in any review of conflict related deaths "otherwise, we will not have credibility".

This is correct. It is also the case that a substantial degree of openness is important in any review of conflict related deaths otherwise it will not have credibility. The process to date has been marked by an absence of openness particularly on the part of the NIO.

For those who wish to make an informed decision there is precious little in the public domain aside from the misleading NIO statement referred to above. This means that the most important group of all, those who have lost loved ones, have not been included. It is vital in such a sensitive issue that the discussion should take place in a spirit of openness and honesty. For this reason we believe that the best contribution we can make from the perspective of the PFC is to put our understanding of the proposal in the public domain and allow you to respond. This in turn will allow others to decide how they should respond.

Below we are listing the PFC understanding of some of the key issues.

A new unit, the Historical Enquiry Team, has been set up and will review all files relating to conflict related deaths between 1969 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The Serious Crime Review Team, (SCRT) which is an internal PSNI unit, will have no further responsibility for deaths which occurred before the Agreement and will focus on post Agreement serious crime only.

All cases previously reviewed by the SCRT will be revisited by the new unit without prejudice to any decisions reached in the past. The new unit will liase with families throughout this process.

The Historical Enquiry Team will be led by Dave Cox, formerly of the Metropolitan Police and senior investigating officer in the Stevens 3 inquiry. The Head of Investigations will be Phil James, formerly of the Stevens 3 Inquiry and Metropolitan Police and now seconded to the PSNI. The new unit will be staffed by members of the PSNI, former members of the RUC and officers recruited from England, Scotland and Wales and the Garda Siochana.

The unit will review all conflict related deaths where no ‘principals’ have been convicted and subject to support from the family of the victim.

In contrast to the NIO statement state killings will also be reviewed. The figure of 1800 is thus incorrect and the more accurate figure is likely to be closer to 2200.

All cases involving state killings and those involving allegations of collusion will be referred by Dave Cox to a special team within the unit made up of officers who are not drawn from the PSNI or RUC. The unit will not rely on existing PSNI files to decide if allegations of collusion exist and will accept additional information from families, NGOs and/or legal representatives.

The prioritisation of cases will be based primarily on issues of chronology and a set of criteria will be set out, (for instance to look at older cases first before witnesses die)

There are four situations where the PSNI would deviate from this;

1. Cases already opened by the SCRT which will be revisited (approx 100),
2. Cases taken out of order because they are linked,
3. Humanitarian concerns (e.g. very elderly or ill next of kin),
4. Over-riding public interest (e.g. major allegations of collusion with the security forces)

The protocols for liaison with families, NGOs and legal representatives have yet to be decided.

The non-investigation by the Military Police of a large number of killings by British soldiers in the early seventies was raised by the NGOs. By definition there is little or no information in these files because of the decision not to investigate these killings. Therefore it would be unacceptable to make any decisions on these cases on the basis of empty files. This remains a major issue of concern which has yet to be resolved.

Following review of a file and where no further investigative or criminal issues are outstanding the Historical Enquiry Team would adopt a policy of maximum disclosure of information to families subject to certain legal constraints. (For example families will not be informed of the identities of suspects who have not been convicted in the courts.)

It was agreed that the current language, whereby state killings are not referred to as ‘murders’, is hurtful and inaccurate. This remains a major issue of concern which has yet to be resolved.

The PSNI does not regard this initiative as constituting the British Government or PSNI response to the debate around truth recovery processes. The unit may be in a position to provide information to individual families but this should not and cannot be seen as the truth and reconciliation model. Notwithstanding the stated PSNI position many have major concerns that the British Government will attempt to portray this initiative as the template for any truth and reconciliation model.

This represents a summary of our understanding of the PSNI approach. It is our hope that this will contribute to opening up an informed discussion, and the beginnings of a more public, and more widely-owned, debate about how best to deal with the legacy of the conflict.