It’s September 1975. Opposition leader Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative spokesman on the North, Airey Neave, meet with Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and Northern Secretary, Merlyn Rees. Two weeks earlier, two loyalist ambushes at fake security force checkpoints had resulted in five murders.
One MoD memo from November 1972 titled 'Security Forces and UDA' instructs that operations 'should be directed against their criminal extremist elements whilst making every endeavour to maintain good relations with law abiding citizens in the organisation.' The RUC apparently had similar instructions. Vigilante type patrols should be tolerated…
The issue of UDA membership of the UDR, a locally recruited regiment of the British Army, was the subject of various memos and correspondence.
Two pages of a memo (AG 1971 p2 and AG 1971 p3) concerning the visit of a J.M. Parkin, Head of C2 at HQNI (British Army HQ) in the North to the then Attorney General Basil Kelly, a Unionist MP. In reference to any potential prosecutions of soldiers for the murder of civilians Parkin notes,
A diary of the meeting between J.M Parkin, Head of C2 and HQNI and Attorney General Basil Kelly and additional confirmation that the Attorney General fully understood that HQNI was telling him that he should not prosecute soldiers. In effect the military tail was wagging the legal dog. This meeting took place less than two months before Bloody Sunday
The original intelligence report prepared for the Joint Intelligence Committee and Downing St
Orwellian legal advice on UDA roadblocks from 1972 Advice note from Ministry of Home Affairs dated 22 August 1972 (by this date the duties of this Ministry had been taken over by the Northern Ireland Office) which seeks to retrospectively justify UDA roadblocks which were frequent throughout Belfast and elsewhere in the summer of 1972. The advice note states that...
Ministry of Defence internal letter where allegations of collusion are discussed in relation to UDR arms losses.